Isidor Zeuner submitted by
on Jan 22 2015:
some thoughts in-line:
Finally, distributors of consumer wallets can use this research in Sure. I guess there will be wallets for all kinds of people in future,
order to distribute their wallet with policies which may be less prone
to Tor-specific attacks. Or leave this out altogether if their
audience has different expectations for connecting to Bitcoin.
sharing a common core that they can customise (this is certainly the vision
and general direction for bitcoinj, and it's working out OK).
To clarify, my comments above were for mainstream granny-focused wallets.
Wallets designed for crypto geeks can and should expose all the knobs to
let people run wild.
I hear that. But I don't see why mainstream wallets and wallets
designed for crypto research should not share a common core. Nor do I
understand why having a common core for different types of wallets
should be reserved for BitcoinJ.
When Bitcoin was pretty new, having a less customizable core did
probably have more of a merit in order to achieve network stability
through monoculture. But as of today, Bitcoin has proven itself as
being capable of allowing a variety of client application to run on
the network, so why should the reference implementation not reflect
this kind of diversity? The policy the mainstream distribution imposes
upon the core can still be rather restrictive.
One possible direction to go is to use Tor for writing to the network and
use general link encryption and better Bloom filtering for reading it. Thus
new transactions would pop out of Tor exits, but there isn't much they can
do that's malicious there except mutate them or block them entirely. If you
insert the same transaction into the P2P network via say 10 randomly chosen
exits, the worst a malicious mutator can do is race the real transaction
and that's no different to a malicious P2P node. Even in a world where an
attacker has DoS-banned a lot of nodes and now controls your TX submission
path entirely, it's hard to see how it helps them.
It might deserve some research in order to determine how Tor's
privacy guarantees might be impacted if we allow attackers to mess
around with exit node choices in a rather predictable and low-cost
manner. Unfortunately, I can't think of another (non-Bitcoin)
application which puts Tor to a similar test.
The nice thing about the above approach is that it solves the latency
problems. Startup speed is really an issue for reading from the network:
just syncing the block chain is already enough of a speed hit without
adding consensus sync as well. But if you're syncing the block chain via
the clearnet you can connect to Tor in parallel so that by the time the
user has scanned a QR code, verified the details on the screen and then
pressed the Pay button, you have a warm connection and can upload the TX
through that. It reduces the level of startup time optimisation needed,
although Tor consensus download is still too slow even to race a QR code
scan at the moment. I think tuning the consensus caching process and
switching to a fresh one on the fly might be the way to go.
I do agree that hybrid clearnet/Tor approaches come with interesting
When BIP70 is in use, you wouldn't write the tx to the network yourself but
you could download the PaymentRequest and upload the Payment message via an
SSLd Tor connection to the merchant. Then malicious exits can only DoS you
but not do anything else so there's no need for multiple exit paths
BIP70 is interesting, indeed, although I still fail to understand why
(according to the specs I saw) the PaymentRequest message is signed,
but not the Payment message.
But in context of the discussed protocol issues, I think it just moves
the issue from the payer to the payee, so it may or may not partially
relieve network-related issues, depending on the usage scenario.
Isidor original: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-January/007173.html
arXiv:1805.11060 Date: submitted by
2018-05-28 Author(s): Giulia Fanti
, Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan
, Surya Bakshi
, Bradley Denby
, Shruti Bhargava
, Andrew Miller
, Pramod Viswanath
Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.
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Title: Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network. Authors: Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivan Pustogarov. Download PDF Abstract: Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be ... Bitcoin is a decentralized P2P digital currency in which coins are generated by a distributed set of miners and transaction are broadcasted via a peer-to-peer network. While Bitcoin provides some ... Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability. We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link ... Deanonymisation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network. Pages 15–29. Previous Chapter Next Chapter. ABSTRACT . Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase ... Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network Alex Biryukov University of Luxembourg [email protected] Dmitry Khovratovich University of Luxembourg [email protected] Ivan Pustogarov University of Luxembourg [email protected] Abstract Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast ...
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